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EXONERATION CLAUSES IN TRUST INSTRU"MENTS
HENRY A. SHINNt
MoRE than three quarters of a century ago the Autocrat of the Break-
fast Table advised, "Put not your trust in money, but put your money
in trust." Whether he is now generally read or not, millions of
people have acted upon that or similar counsel. In 1929, according
to a survey made by the American Bankers' Association, more than
a thousand millionaires appointed in their wills trust companies as
the executors and trustees of their estates. When we consider that
a great part of the wealth of the nation passes through the hands
of executors and trustees, that billions of dollars' worth of bond
issues pass annually through the custody of trust companies, and
that more and more the power of the dead hand is used in directing
the fortunes of this country, we realize the magnitude of the business
of modern trust companies.'
With land, mortgages, stocks, and bonds rapidly depreciating in
value the beneficiaries of these billions of trust funds are asking
their trustees to account for losses. A number of such cases have
already reached the highest courts,2 and others are either now pend-
-Professor of Law, Mercer University.
1. The sxty-ninth annual report of the Comptroller of Currency concerning
National Banks in the Trust Field states: "Substantial and steady progress
marked the activities of national banks throughout the United States in the
administration of trusts in 1931. The statistics for this function compiled
as of June 30, 1931, revealed that 2,407 national banks had authority to exercise
trust powers, with a combined capital of $1,349,393,246 and banking resources
of $22,618,549,942, representing 35 per cent of the number, 80 per cent of
the capital, and 82 per cent of the resources of all banks in the national banking
system.
Trust departments had been established by 1,856 of these banks and 102,987
trusts were being administered with individual trust assets aggregating
$5,241,991,392. Seven hundred and eighty-two of these banks were also acting
as trustees for bond and note issues aggregating $10,719,846,426.
"The growing popularity with the American public of the corporate fiduciary
in the settlement of estates and the administration of trusts is illustrated by the
fact that compared with June 30, 1930, the survey revealed a net increase of
11,564, or 12.6 per cent more trusts under administration in 1931 than in 1930,
while the individual trust assets under administration increased $708,950,466, or
17 per cent over 1930." These increases, it should be noted, took place during
a depression year.
2. In re Clark's Will, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397 (1931); North Adams
National Bank v. Curtis, 180 N. E. 217 (Mass. 1932).
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ing or in the more embryonic stage of legal consultation. In many
of these recent cases the trust companies are relying upon safety
devices, written into the trust agreements, which exonerate the
trustee from all liability for losses except those incurred through
gross neglect or wilful default. In addition to this general immunity
clause, the trust agreements frequently contain special exemptions
which negative every expressed duty, such as the duty to record
a mortgage, to insure the trust fund, or to answer for the defaults
of a co-trustee, an agent, or an employee.8
Several recently decided cases, among them North Adams National
Bank v. Curtis,4 a Massachusetts case, and In Re Clark's Will,' a
New York case, have aroused considerable interest concerning the
force and effectiveness of the usual immunity clause in trust agree-
ments. The Clark's Will case has stimulated much comment, in
legal journals 6 as well as in popular magazines, 7 to the effect that
trust companies may by contract do everything but wilfully rob the
beneficiary. The North Adams National Bank case has been con-
strued as holding directly-and the language of the opinion pos-
sibly justifies it-that a trust company, acting under an exoneration
clause, is liable only for its wilful defaults. These two recent cases
which we shall consider presently, and other like cases which the
depression will most assuredly bring before the courts, should make
an investigation of the effectiveness of exoneration clauses of timely
consideration. How far, then, may a trust company as trustee con-
tract against its liabilities for losses incurred through negligent
conduct, though acting in good faith?
It is a general rule of law that a trustee is held to that degree
of care exercised by "an ordinary prudent man" in the management
of his own business under similar circumstances.
"A trustee is bound to employ such diligence and such prudence in the
care and management of the trust estate as, in general, prudent men of
3. In ro Knower's Estate, 121 Misc. 208, 200 N. Y. Supp. 777 (Sur. Ct. 1923);
Bell v. Title, Trust, and Guarantee Co., 292 Pa. 228, 140 Atl. 900 (1928);
Indiana I. and I. R. Co. v. Swanell, 157 Ill. 616, 41 N. E. 989 (1895).
4. See supra note 2.
5. Ibid.
6. Note (1930) 29 MIcH. L. REv. 125; Note (1930) 30 Cor. L. Rav. 1166;
"That any trustee, corporate or otherwise, could sit idly by and see a company
in which it held securities retrograde to almost a position of bankruptcy, and
do nothing with respect to the securities, and at the same time seek to escape
liability for such negligence, is not to be thought of in a modern enlightened
age, no matter how clear the good faith." N. Y. L. J., June 25, 1930, at 1637.
7. Can Trust Companies Be Trusted? FoRuM, Oct. 1932.
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discretion and intelligence in such matters employ in their own like
affairs." 8
Any neglect or omission on the part of the trustee to measure up
to the above standard of care is a breach of duty for which he is
liable to the beneficiary for any losses incurred.0
Exoneration clauses in wills and trust contracts provide for im-
munity from losses in two general situations. In the first class the
testator in his will or the settlor in the trust instrument directs the
trustee to retain in the trust estate specific investments, exempting
the trust company from liability for any losses which may occur
from the retention of these securities, unless caused by its gross
neglect or wilful default. In the second class the testator or the
settlor turns over the assets of his estate to the trustee with power
to invest and re-invest, providing that the trust company shall be
liable only for losses caused by its gross neglect or wilful default.10
While the scope of this discussion is primarily to consider the
second class, it may be well to recall briefly what the courts are doing
in cases which come within the first classification. The courts gen-
erally recognize that the retention of speculative stocks, which have
been purchased by the testator or the creator of the trust, is quite
a different thing from the retention of such stocks purchased by
8. 77 A. L. R. 500 (1932); also, 26 R. C. L. 1280 and numerous cases there
cited.
9. Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Northern Trust Co., 250 Ill. 86, 95
N. E. 59 (1911) ; Gibney v. Allen, 156 Mich. 301, 120 N. W. 811 (1909) ; Steward
v. Traverse City State Bank, 187 Mich. 387, 153 N. W. 793 (1915) ; In re Union
Trust Co, 219 N. Y. 514, 114 N. E. 1057 (1916); Moeller v. Poland, 80 Ohio
St. 418, 89 N. E. 100 (1909) ; Newman v. Shreve, 229 Pa. 200, 78 At]. 79 (1910);
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 81 S. C. 506, 62 S. E. 845 (1908).
10. There is another group of cases in which the trustee is given full dis-
cretion in selecting the investments. In this class of cases it is well settled that
the uncontrolled discretionary power does not render the trustee immune from
losses caused by his imprudent or careless investments. In rc Hall, 104 N. Y.
196, 58 N. E. 11 (1900); Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 123 N. E. 135 (1919);
Gould v. Gould, 126 Misc. 54, 213 N. Y. Supp. 286 (Sup. CL 1925); Indiana
Trust Co. v. Griffith, 176 Ind. 643, 95 N. E. 573 (1911); Holcomb v. Holcomb,
11 N. J. Eq. 281 (1857); Clark v. Garfield, 8 Allen 427 (Mass. 1864); Kimball
v. Reding, 31 N. H. 352 (1855); In re Hart's Estate, 203 Pa. 480, 53 At]. 364
(1902); Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N. E. 381 (1909); Pinney
v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 33 Atl. 591 (1895). On the other hand, it
is generally held that, if the beneficiary voluntarily directs or requests
the trustee to act, he is later estopped to collect damages for such action.-
Villard v. Villard, 219 N. Y. 482, 114 N. E. 789 (1916); Michigan Home Mis-
sionary Society v. Corning, 164 Mich. 395, 129 N. W. 686 (1911); In re Fidelity
and Deposit Co, 172 Mich. 600, 138 N. W. 205 (1912); Wieters v. Hart, 68 N. J.
Eq: 796, 64 Atl. 1135 (1905); Furniss v. Zimmerman, 90 Misc. 138, 154 N. Y.
Supp. 272 (Sup. Ct. 1915) ; In re Detre's Estate, 273 Pa. 340, 117 At]. 54 (1922).
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the trustee. One who is looking for the right opportunity to free
himself from a declining market deserves more consideration than
one who takes the bull by the horns. It is a well recognized fact
that a careful investor will hold on to declining securities rather
than take an actual loss, when he would not go into the market and
invest in those securities. A vast majority of cases and jurisdic-
tions, with few exceptions," hold that an exonerating clause im-
munizes a trustee against losses incurred through retaining, at the
request of the testator or the creator of the trust, the original assets
of the estate. Among such jurisdictions are England,12 Massachu-
setts,13 New York,14 Pennsylvania,'5 Alabama,' 6 Rhode Island, 17
Vermont,' 8 and New Jersey.' 9
"There is a great difference," states the New York Court of Appeals
in Jones v. Jones,20 "between an investment by the trustees of moneys
forming a part of the estate, and the retention of securities purchased
by the testator, and held by him at the time of his decease. In the one
case the investment, whether wise or unwise, is the independent, uncon-
trollable act of the owner; and in the other it is the act of the trustees,
whose discretion is limited and whose duties are prescribed; and each ts
to be subjected, therefore, to wholly different rules."
Or in the words of a comparatively early English opinion in Mars-
den v. Kent,
21
"It would be very hard upon executors, who have been saddled with property
of this speculative kind and have endeavored to do their duty honestly, If
they were to be fixed with a loss arising from their not having taken what,
as it is proved by the result, would have been the best course."
11. Citizens' & Southern National Bank v. Clark, 172 Ga. 625, 158 S. E. 297
(1931) held the trustee to the same rules of liability, whether dealing with the
original assets of the estate or his own investments. See also Note (1930) 30
CoL. L. REv. 1166.
12. Marsden v. Kent, 5 Ch. Div. 598 (1877); Cocks v. Chapman, [18903
2 Ch. Div. 763.
13. Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N. E. 647 (1930); Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Shaw, 261 Mass. 158, 158 N. E. 530 (1927).
14. In re Clark's Will, supra note 2; In re Winburn, 140 Misc. 18, 249 N. Y.
Supp. 758 (Sur. Ct. 1931); Jones v. Jones, 50 Hun 603, 2 N. Y. Supp. 844
(Sup. Ct. 1888); In re Sherman, 180 App. Div. 196, 167 N. Y. Supp. 682 (8d
Dep't 1907).
15. In -re Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 135 Atl. 112 (1926); In ro Taylor's
Estate, 277 Pa. 528, 121 Atl. 310 (1923).
16. Foscue v. Lyon, 55 Ala. 440 (1876).
17. Peckham v. Newton, 15 R. I. 321, 4 Atl. 758 (1886).
18. Scoville v. Brock, 81 Vt. 405, 70 Atl. 1014 (1908).
19. McCully v. Lum, 49 N. J. Eq. 552, 25 Atl. 705 (1892).
20. See note 14, supra.
21. Supra note 12, at 601.
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The courts recognize that it is no easy matter to determine the
right time to unload speculative securities on a declining or gen-
erally fluctuating market.
"We are to look at the facts as they exist," says the New York court in
Purdy v. Lynch,22 "at the time of their occurrence, not aided or enlightened
by those which subsequently take place, by reason of which the loss has
occurred, for it is an obvious truth that a wisdom developed after an event
and having it and its consequences as a source, is a standard no man should
be judged by."
In Pennsylvania, where the courts hold the trustee to a very high
degree of care and strictly construe against the trust company any
statute or clause in the trust agreement which broadens the trustee's
liberties or limits his liabilities, the Supreme Court in In Re Taylor's
Estate,2 quoting from an earlier opinion, said,
"The negligence imputed to this appellant did not arise from keeping the
trust fund invested in the form in which it came into the hands of the
trustee; there so strict a rule of liability does not apply as in the case of a
loss in investments made after the trustee had actually received the money."
The same court in In Re Browits Estate,24 stated further,
"They (trustees) need not rush into a conversion of the securities left by
the decedent and, under the whip of the law, sell them below what they
might normally expect to receive for them, thus causing an estate to shrink
out of all proportions to any possible benefit that might arise through a
strict application of the rule." 25
We now come to a consideration of In Re ClarWs Will, which has
caused much comment, both lay and legal. The testator, Frederick
H. Clark, turned over to the trustee, through his executor, 1248
shares of common stock of the Cuban American Sugar Company,
valued at $22 per share and 296 shares of Guantanamo Sugar Com-
pany, valued at $12.50 per share. There was a provision in Mr.
Clark's will which read as follows:
22. 145 N. Y. 462, 475, 40 N. E. 232, 236 (1895).
23. Supra note 15 at 528, 121 Atl. 313.
24. Supra note 15 at 502, 135 Atl. at 313.
25. In England where the trustee is held to a high degree of accountability
Cocks v. Chapman, [1896J 2 Ch. Div. 763, held that where a will authorizes in-
vestments in mortgage on real estate and part of the testator's estate at his
death consists of mortgages on farm land, there is no rule that his executors
and trustees are under an absolute duty to call in the securities within twelve
months from the testator's death even though some of the securities may be
of a risky nature, as where, owing to an agricultural depression, they have
apparently become insufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt.
1933]
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"I hereby authorize and empower my executors and trustees to continue
all the investments of money in the securities made by me and which shall
come into their possession and control at my decease, without any personal
liability for so doing.
On the arrival of the beneficiary at the age of thirty-five, when the
trust was to be distributed, the Cuban shares had fallen in value
to $7 per share, and the Guantanamo to $.50 per share. The order
of the Appellate Division 26 sustaining the Surrogate in charging
the trust company with the loss was reversed by the Court of Ap-
peals, 27 which held that
"The testator had an absolute right to provide that his trustee should not
be liable for losses accruing from the retention of the securities, although
it may have been imprudent so to retain them."
Inasmuch as the court found that the trustee had 
acted with due
care and without negligence and that the beneficiaries had given
silent consent to the holding of these securities, it was not necessary
for the court to rely on the exoneration clause to save the trustee
from loss. "Even if the immunity from liability provided for by
the testator does not cover the case," concludes the opinion, "we
think that there was no fault and that it was error to so find."
Considering this case on the facts as finally established by the Court
of Appeals, it cannot be claimed, as some of the critics of this case
have asserted,28 that the immunity clause has become a cloak to
all evil, except that of bad faith. This was a plain case of retain-
ing certain securities at the direction of the executor, in which cases
the courts have generally held that a trustee who follows, under
an immunity clause, the direction of an executor is not liable for
losses that may result.29 The vast majority of opinions which give
verbal approval, if not actual effect, to the exoneration clause are
cases, it is believed, like In Re Clark's Will and other cases to which
we have referred, where the trustee was following the specific direc-
tions of the executor in retaining the original investments of the
estate.
Let us now consider the liability of a trustee who has the power
to invest and reinvest at his discretion the assets of the estate, under
an immunity clause which exonerates him from all liability except
26. 232 App. Div. 781, 249 N. Y. Supp. 923 (2d Dep't 1931).
27. Supra note 2, at 137, 177 N. E. at 398.
28. See supra note 6.
29. See notes 12-19, supra.
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that incurred through "gross neglect or wilful default." Such an
exculpating clause, if effective, greatly lessens the trustee's general
responsibilities and liabilities for losses. Especially is this true
under modern statutes which have expanded the liberties of the
trustee in investing and depositing the assets of the estate.20 Lib-
erating statutes and contracts limiting liabilities open a wide gate
through which negligent, if not dishonest, trustees may pass, unless
the courts stand guard to protect their ancient wards, the bene-
ficiaries.
At a time when careless investments become worthless securities,
beneficiaries may well ask: May a trust company, through carless-
ness, permit a trust security materially to depreciate in value and
escape liability through an immunity clause? May it, through care-
lessness, fail to collect the assets of the estate from the creator of
the trust, the beneficiary, a co-trustee, or a debtor of the estate and
escape liability under an exculpating clause? May a trust company
in good faith, but not under a statute, deposit the funds in the com-
mercial department of the bank and lose them and yet escape lia-
bility on the ground that it was not acting in bad faith? In short,
may it commit all the sins of avarice that the human flesh is heir to
and under a protective cloak escape persecution by kneeling at the
altar of bona fides?
Exoneration clauses, though recently coming into general use by
corporate fiduciaries, are not new. In the early part of the nine-
teenth century the English courts were denouncing their validity.
In Mucklow v. Fuller,31 decided in 1821, Chancellor Eldon held that
an indemnity clause, which provided that neither of two co-trustees
should be liable for the neglect of the other, did not exonerate one
of the trustees from a loss sustained by the other. To the same
effect is Dix v. Burford.3:2 In this case one of two co-trustees had
collected a mortgage, released the estate, and squandered the funds.
The other co-trustee defended under an immunity clause, which
provided that the co-trustees
"should not be chargeable, but only for their respective receipts, payments,
acts, and wilful defaults."
But the Master of the Rolls in his opinion held,
30. Tah REv. STAT (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 148, § 32.
The test of care in making the investment is that caution and care, which an
intelligent person would use with his own money. For other statutes and
decisions in various states see McKiNNEY, TRUST INVESTMENTS (1927).
31. Jac. 198, 37 Eng. Rep. 824 (1821).
32. 19 Beav. 409, 52 Eng. Rep. 408 (1854).
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"The ordinary trustee indemnity clause affords no security to a trustee who
neglects to take the step necessary to secure the fund." 83
Fenwick v. Greenwefl 84 concerned a marriage settlement in which
a trust fund had been provided for the husband, wife, and children.
The funds consisted of 5000-pound consols which were the personal
property of the wife before the marriage. The trustees never re-
ceived a conveyance from the wife whose husband dissipated the
funds. In an action by the children against the trustees it was held
that an indemnity clause, which provided that they should not be
liable for any involuntary loss without their wilful default, afforded
no immunity. A fortiori, a court should hold that an exonerating
clause provides no protection to the trustee who fails to collect from
a debtor of the estate, its executor, or the creator of the trust.
Turning again to English cases that have adjudicated the force of
exonerating clauses in protecting the investments and deposits of
the assets of the estate, we find among the early cases Drosier V.
Brereton,85 decided in 1851. In this case the trustees, acting in
good faith, lent money secured by a mortgage on a house that fell
into poor repair. Notwithstanding an immunity clause, which pro-
vided that the trustees should not be liable for any depreciation in
value of the trust assets except through their wilful default, the
court held them accountable for the loss. A fortiori, the court should
reach the same conclusion, had the investments been in common
stocks or even bonds. In Rehden v. Wesley 31 the trustees drew the
assets of the estate out of the Union Bank of London and deposited
them in their own names in another bank which immediately failed.
Even though the will contained an indemnity clause against losses
by a banker of moneys deposited for safe keeping, the Master of
the Rolls held the trustees liable to the estate. The facts do not show
that the bank had been designated as a depositary for trust funds,
If that were the case, the trustee would be protected without an
exonerating clause if he used due care in making the deposit.3 7
The exonerating clause in Knox v. MacKinnon 88 provided that
the trustee "shall not be liable for omissions, errors, or neglect of
management." The trust deed further stipulated that the trustee
should loan out the trust funds on such securities as they might
33. Supra note 32 at 413, 52 Eng. Rep. at 410. To the same effect are
Brice v. Stokes, 11 Yes. 319, 32 Eng. Rep. 1111 (1805); Sadler v. Hobbs, 2
Bro. C. C. 114, 29 Eng. Rep. 66 (1786).
34. 10 Beav. 412, 50 Eng. Rep. 640 (1847).
35. 15 Beav. 221, 51 Eng. Rep. 521 (1851).
36. 29 Beav. 213, 54 Eng. Rep. 609 (1861).
37. In re Kruger's Estate, 141 Misc. 475, 252 N. Y. Supp. 688 (Sur. Ct. 1931)
38. 13 App. Cas. 753, 755 (1888).
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think proper. The trustee in good faith, but not with that degree
of care and diligence which a "man of ordinary prudence would
have exercised in his own concern," conveyed the tenements of the
estate to one of the beneficiaries and took back a mortgage on it
and other property to secure 12,000 pounds of the purchase price.
The beneficiary and his father-in-law were personally bound on the
note. Ten years after the loan the beneficiary and his father-in-law
were bankrupt and the security was practically worthless. This
was not an unlawful loan under the terms of the trust but a plain
case of not exercising "due care." The trustee took cover under
the immunity clause, but the House of Lords in its opinion expressed
by Lord Watson said,
"I see no reason to doubt that a clause conceived in these or similar terms,
will afford a considerable measure of protection to trustees who have bona
fide abstained from closely superintending the administration of the trust
or have committed mere errors of judgment whilst acting with a single eye
to the benefit of the trust. . . . But it is settled in the law of Scotland
that such a clause is ineffectual to protect a trustee against the consequences
of culpa lata, or gross negligence on his part, or of any conduct which is
inconsistent with bona fides."
In connection with this declaration of the law by the House of
Lords concerning negligence and exoneration clauses in trust agree-
ments, it is interesting to note that the courts are prone to consider,
as in this case, any action short of closely superintending the trust
as gross neglect of duty.39 While there are not a great number of
English cases in the reports, those that have been decided, with few
exceptions, 40 from Mucklow v. Fuller, down to the Trustees Act of
1925 41 (which repealed the "honestly and reasonably" clause in
the Judicial Trustees Act of 1896) have consistently held that good
faith alone under an immunity clause will not absolve a trustee from
39. Rae v. Meek, 14 App. Cas. 558 (1889); Stiles v. Guy, 1 H. & Tw. 523,
47 Eng. Rep. 1517 (1849); Paddon v. Richardson, 7 DeG. MI. & G. 563, 44 Eng.
Rep. 219 (1855).
40. Though English courts materially reduce the force of the immunity
clause, they are careful not to deny that it does afford some measure of pro-
tection. In Wilkins v. Hogg, 3 Giff. 116, 118, 66 Eng. Rep. 346 (1881). Vice-
Chancellor Stuart in making reply to argument of counsel said: "The argument
has proceeded on the assumption that the usual indemnity clause amounts to
nothing; that it never receives a literal interpretation, but that the court vll
look generally at the conduct of the trustee, and, for any carelessness or any
act that a prudent man ought not to have committed, will visit the trustee who
has been guilty of such acts, whatever may be the language of the will. That
is not the law of this court." See also Bartlett v. Hodgson, 1 T. R. 42, 99 Eng.
Rep. 962 (1785).
41. 15 Geo. V. c. 19, § 61 (1925).
1933]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the sins of negligence in collecting, depositing, investing, and guard-
ing the assets of the estate.
42
While the American courts have, for the most part, been more
lenient with the trustee than have the English courts, they have
manifestly evaded a direct application of exonerating clauses. Few
cases, outside those where the trustee was retaining securities at
the direction of the testator, have held that the immunity clause
saved a negligent trustee from liability for losses.43 In cases of this
kind the American jurisdictions are prone to dodge the exoneration
clause in one of three ways: first, to hold that the negligent act
resulted in a clear breach of the trustee's duties so that the immunity
clause does not apply; second, to hold that there was no negligence
in the act done and, therefore, no liability; or third, to hold that
the act done amounted to gross neglect or wilful default and, there-
fore, was not protected by the exoneration clause. This tendency
to shift the ground so as to avoid an application of the exonerating
clause is in part explanatory of the words of a recent writer 44 who
says,
"There is surprisingly little authority on the interpretation of the usual
provision in the ordinary trust that the trustee shall be liable only for a
'wilful default'."
This shifting of the ground permits the courts to reach the same
conclusions they would have reached had the clause not been used
and consequently negatives its protective value. Let us consider
two New York cases, In Re Garvin's Will 45 and In Re Jarvis's
Estate.45 In the Garvin case the trustee was holding stocks that
greatly depreciated in value, and in the Jarvis case the trustee was
holding bonds which similarly depreciated. In the former case
the trustee was not protected by an immunity clause, while he was
in the latter. The courts, however, reached the same result in each
case. In the Garvin case, in which there was no immunity clause,
the court found the trustee "negligent" in holding common stock in
a declining market and hence liable to the infant beneficiary. In
the Jarvis case the court found the trustee "grossly negligent" in
holding depreciating bonds and, therefore, not protected from lia-
bility to the beneficiary by the immunity clause. If anything, there
42. See Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, [1914] App. Cas. 932.
43. Crabb v. Young, 92 N. Y. 56 (1883); In re Knower's Estate, supra
note 3.
44. Posner, Liability of Corporate Trustees (1928) 42 HARV. L. RE'. 198,
243n.
45. 256 N. Y. 518, 177 N. E. 24 (1931).
46. 110 Misc. 5, 180 N. Y. Supp. 324 (Sur. Ct. 1920).
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was greater negligence in the Garvin case than in the Jarvis ease,
for common stocks are, as a rule, considered more of. a risk in a
declining market than are bonds. All the court had to do in the
Jarvis case was to shift from "negligence" to "gross negligence,"
and the trick was accomplished, the same result reached.
The same shifting may take place when the lower and the higher
courts consider the same set of facts. For example, in In Re Clark's
Will, the Surrogate and the Supreme Court of New York held that
the retention of sugar stock in a declining market was a degree of
negligence which was not protected by the immunity clause. The
Court of Appeals, being of the opinion that the trustees were not
liable, shifted in the other direction, holding that there was no negli-
gence, therefore, no liability, and of course no necessity to consider
the effect of the immunity clause. The lower courts held the trustees
liable, the Court of Appeals reversed them, and neither found it
necessary to rely upon the exoneration clause.
In North Adams National Bank v. Curtis,4 7 the recent Massa-
chusetts case previously referred to, the will provided,
"that in the event of any loss resulting to my estate through any act done
or investment made in connection therewith in good faith by my said
trustees hereunder, they shall not be held to any personal accountability
or responsibility therefor."
The trial judge found as facts that the trustees acted in good faith
and that they did not act imprudently or negligently. These findings
of fact were not disturbed by the Supreme Court. Having estab-
lished that the trustees acted in good faith and with due care in
performing their duties, it followed that they were not liable for
any losses, whether or not there was an exoneration clause. Any
discussion of the clause would be clearly superfluous. While there
are statements in the opinion of this case to the effect that the
exoneration clause would protect the trustee, it is not a direct de-
cision on that point.
48
In Conover v. Guarantee Trust Company40 it seems that the
trustee, either through bad judgment or ignorance of its duties,
accepted securities which it was not empowered under the trust
47. Supra note 2.
48. The opinion in North Adams National Bank states: "The testator had
the right to make the provision relating to the exemption of the trustee from
personal liability," and supports it with the following cases: Anderson v. Bean;
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Shaw, both supra note 13; In ro Clark's Will, oupra
note 2. It should be noted, however, that in each of these cases, the testator
directed his trustee to retain certain stocks or shares and that the rule is well
settled that in such a case the exoneration clause is given full force.
49. 88 N. J. Eq. 450, 461, 102 Atl. 844, 848 (1917).
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agreement to hold. The trust company acted under an immunity
clause which held it free from liability for any mistake of judgment
or discretion. The New Jersey court, however, shifted the act done
from a question of poor judgment or discretion to a breach of the
trust powers.
"It seems to me," states the court, "impossible to doubt that when a trustee
transcends his powers by accepting securities for this trust of a nature or
class which by the terms of the trust he is not authorized to accept, all
inquiries touching his judgment, mistaken exercise of discretion, good faith
and the value of the securities so accepted are necessarily excluded from
consideration. . . . It accordingly seems impossible to construe an im-
munity clause as intending to exempt a trustee from liability for transcend-
ing his powers as clearly defined by the trust agreement."
When, as in this case, the court shifts the consequences of bad judg-
ment or negligence over to a breach of duty, the protective power
of the immunity clause is on uncertain ground. For, may not
negligence, which results in failing to collect the assets of the estate,
in selecting an unsafe depositary, in buying bonds from the com-
mercial department of the bank, or in any one of a number of un-
intentional wrongs that a trustee may do, become breaches of duties
that are not protected by an immunity clause? While "trustees
acting honestly with ordinary prudence and within the limits of
their trust are not liable for mere errors of judgment," 50 yet once
the negligent act is interpreted as a breach of duty, good faith of
the trustee cannot alter its liability.51
In Tuttle v. Gilmore 52 the will provided that the trustee should
not be liable except for his wilful and intentional breaches of the
trust. On the advice of counsel the trustee accepted as securities
second mortgages on real estate which he sold from the estate and
50. In re Clark's Will, supra note 2, at 137, 177 N. E. 398.
51. In Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, [1914J App. Cas. 932, 954, Lord Haldano
reached the same conclusion as that in Conover v. Guarantee Trust Co., supra,
when he said: "When fraud is referred to in the wider sense in which the
books are full of the expression, used in chancery in describing cases which
were within its exclusive jusisdiction, it is a mistake to suppose that an actual
intent to cheat must always be proved. A man may misconceive the extent
of the obligation which a court of equity imposes on him. His fault is that he
has violated, however innocently because of his ignorance, an obligation which
he must be taken by the court to have known. . . . The trustee who purchases
the trust estate, the solicitor who makes a bargain with his client that cannot
stand, have all for several centuries run the risk of the word fraudulent being
applied to them." (Italics supplied). Once the court has shifted the negligent
or ignorant act to a breach of duty and constructive fraud, the plea of bona
fides under an immunity clause is of little avail.
52. 36 N. J. Eq.,617 (1883).
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which later proved to be worthless. The investment, however, was
made in good faith and with no intention of personal gain. It was
a plain case of negligence or ignorance. Nevertheless, the court
in its opinion said,
"In my judgment, it is a wilful and intentional breach of trust within the
meaning of this clause to knowingly do any act hazarding trust funds in
violation of a duty imposed on the trustee. That this construction may
leave but little force to the clause is no reason why it should not be adopted."
Here the New Jersey court interpreted, as it did in Gilmore v.
Tuttle,53 a negligent, careless, or ignorant act as an intentional and
wilful breach of the trustee's powers. When the act done is trans-
lated into an intentional breach of duty, the way is clear to hold
the trustee liable notwithstanding an immunity clause.
"Whatever may be the extent of the liability of a trustee justifying under
this clause," states the opinion in Digney v. Blavrclard,6 "we do not construe
it as affording him protection from a wilful and intentional breach of
trust." 55
In this Massachusetts case the immunity clause provided that the
trustee should be liable only for the result of his own gross negli-
gence or bad faith, but the court translated the act, whether in bad
faith or not, which was clearly beyond the trustee's powers, as a
breach of trust and not under the protective veil of the immunity
clause.
It is rather difficult to draw a fixed line between negligence in
doing a thing the trustee is empowered to do, and negligence which
results in doing a thing which the trustee should not do or in fail-
ing to do something he should do. A trustee is under a duty to
collect and preserve the assets of the trust estate. Now if, as a
result of negligence, he fails to collect part or all of the assets, or
permits a security greatly to depreciate in value, has he committed
a breach of his trust duties or is he, after all, only negligent? Is
it not likely that a court will rely upon its discretion in deciding this
question as it did in the cases of Conover v. Guarantee Trust Com-
pany and Tuttle v. Gilmore?
It would seem from the cases considered that the protective force
of the exoneration clause is largely at the discretion of the courts.
It may have some weight in the scale of justice but possibly not
more than the English courts have given it, i.e., to afford leniency
53. 32 N. J. Eq. 611 (1880).
54. 226 Mass. 335, 115 N. E. 424 (1917).
55. See Mattocks v. Moulton, 84 Mlaine 545, 24 Atl. 1004 (1892); Adair v.
Brimmer, 74 N. Y. 539 (1878); Tuttle v. Gilmore, 36 N. J. Eq. 617 (1883).
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toward an honest trustee who has not closely superintended the
trust.
There is a class of cases, other than those where the trustee is
directed to retain certain assets, in which the courts have been
rather liberal in giving full effect to the exoneration clause. In
this group the corporate trustee is acting as a depositary or a stake-
holder of a security on which bonds are issued and sold to the public.
Green v. Title, Guarantee, and Trust Company 50 is a fair illustra-
tion of this class. This suit was brought by holders of the bonds
against the Title Company for its negligence in failing to include
in the indenture of mortgage on which the bonds were issued cer-
tain properties of the mortgagor, for its carelessness in so drafting
the mortgage instrument that it was subsequently declared void as
to creditors, and for its negligence in failing to secure from the
mortgagor a second instrument which would correct the defects in
the first. The trust company in its release of the bonds to the
plaintiff protected itself with an immunity clause which provided
"that the trustee shall not be answerable . . . for anything except its
own gross negligence or wilful misconduct in the discharge of its duties.
* . . The trustee is under no obligation to record or file their indentures in
any office whatsoever or to procure any additional instrument or further
assurances .
The.court left the parties where the exemption clause in the contract
had placed them, with the exception that it held that the trustee
could not contract against its duty to record the mortgage. But
since the mortgage was void, its recordation would not affect the
rights of the parties. In Browning v. Fidelity Trust Company,51
another case of this class, the trustees released bonds after it should
have known that the mortgagor had defaulted in the payment of
interest. The court held, however, that the trustee was not guilty
of "gross negligence" and was, therefore, protected by the immunity
clause which made it accountable only for bad faith. There are a
few other cases !s in which the courts have granted immunity to
corporate trustees acting under exoneration clauses in the issuing
of bonds secured by a mortgage held by the trust company.
It is submitted, however, that these cases are essentially and
inherently different from the true trustee-cestui que trust relation-
ship, for here both the mortgagor who places the security with the
trust company and the purchasers of the bonds that are issued on
56. 223 App. Div. 12, 227 N. Y. Supp. 252 (1st Dep't 1928).
57. 250 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918).
58. Hunsberger v. The Trust Co., 218 N. Y. 742, 113 N. E. 1058 (1916);
Diggs v. The Fidelity & Deposit Co., 112 Md. 50, 75 Atl. 517 (1910).
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those securities are dealing with the trust company at arm's length.
0
They are contracting parties. There is no cestui que trust in the
true sense of the word. The parties all come into the relationship
by contract, whereas in the true trustee relationship the beneficiary
quite generally has little part in preparing the trust instrument.
Through the centuries courts of equity have placed about the cestui
que trust certain safeguards and about the trustee they have in-
scribed certain duties and responsibilities which are inherent in
the relationship of trustee and beneficiary, and independent of the
instrument creating the trust.
It would seem that, outside of those cases in which the testator
or creator of the trust directs his trustee to retain certain securities
exempting him from liability for so doing, and that class of cases
where the trust company is acting as stakeholder and trustee for
both mortgagor and bondholder,60 there are few cases, if any, of
the true trustee-cestui que trust relationship that have gone quite
as far as New York has gone in Crabb v. Young 0  and In Re
Knower's Estate.62  In each of these cases it was held that a care-
less trustee who had invested in insufficient securities was exempt
from liability by an exoneration clause. While Crabb v. Young has
received favorable reference 0 in later New York cases, it stands
alone even in its own jurisdiction as an extreme application of the
protective force of an exoneration clause. In In Re Jarvis's Estate,
a New York case previously discussed, it was held that the exonera-
tion clause
"gave no greater latitude to the executor and trustee than is given by the
Code," which, continues the opinion, "means a common sense standard of
prudence and proper diligence."
59. See Posner, op. cit. supra note 44, at 200 n. 7.
60. To this group should be added another type of trustee, viz., corporate
directors, -whom the courts generally protect under the limited liability clauses
written into the by-laws of the corporation. See In re City Equitable Fire
Insurance Co., [1924] Ch. 407. The problem here, however, is to determine just
who are the beneficiaries. See Dodd, For Whom Ar Corporate Manage s
Trustees? (192) 45 HARv. L. Rnv. 1145. See also Berle, For Whom Corporate
Managers are Trustees (1932) 45 HAnv. L. REv. 1365.
Prof. Dodd, quotes Mr. Owen D. Young, executive officer of the General
Electric Company, as saying that he is trustee for three classes of people, "one
is the group of fifty odd thousand people who have put their capital in the
Company, namely, its stockholders, another is a group of well toward one
hundred thousand people who are putting their labor and their lives into the
business of the Company. The third group is of consumers and the general
public." Dodd, supra at 1154.
61. Supra note 43.
62. Supra note 43.
63. In re Clark's Will, supra note 2.
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Again, the New York Surrogate Court in In Re Clark's Will 04
stated in its opinion that
"good faith of the trustee cannot alter its liability. Even in the face of
authority to 'continue' to hold, vigilance and alert judgment will be re-
quired."65
As corporate fiduciaries double and redouble their business by
holding themselves out to the public as skilled and efficient executors
and trustees, are they not fixing a standard of care higher than that
of the ordinary individual trustee? An increased standard of care
through representations of skill is not a new principle in the law
of Torts. The large city surgeon is held to a higher degree of care
than is the country doctor.
"The rule is that he [the doctor] must exercise that degree of care and
skill ordinarily exercised by the profession in his own and in similar lo-
calities." 66
The same rule applies to lawyers, dentists, surgeons, chiropractors,
and all men who hold themselves out as especially skilled in a par-
ticular field.
"By our law a person who offers his services to the community generally,
or to any individual, for employment in any professional capacity as a
person of skill contracts with his employer," states the New Hampshire
court in Leighton v. Sargent,67 "that he possesses that reasonable degree of
learning, skill, and experience which is ordinarily possessed by the pro-
fessors of the same art or science, and which is ordinarily regarded by
the community, and by those conversant with that employment, as neces-
sary and sufficient to qualify him to engage in such business."
Should not the colorful advertising on the part of trust com-
panies, representing to the public that their officers are skilled
specialists in the business of investing and protecting trust estates,
cause the courts to regard any act that falls short of closely super-
intending the trust as gross negligence which an exoneration clause
will not excuse? In other words, an act that is only "slight negli-
gence" on the part of an ordinary individual trustee should be
considered gross neglect when committed by a specialist in the
field.
64. 136 Misc. 881, 888, 242 N. Y. Supp. 210, 219 (Sur. Ct. 1930).
65. See also In re Channing's Estate, 129 Misc. 393, 222 N. Y. Supp. 351
(Sur. Ct. 1927).
66. CooLEY oN ToRTs (4th ed. 1932) § 473 note 99.
67. 27 N. H. 460, 469 (1853).
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"It is not to be assumed," states the opinion in Villard v. Villard,0S "that
the tist company with all its experie?ce was unwittingly and innocently
deceived into accepting the stock in question." Further, "In trust rela-
tions these days," states the opinion of Surrogate SlaterC9 "when trust
companies have entdred the business, much more is expected from a cor-
porate trustee than from the old-fashioned individual executor or trustee.
Trust companies seek this character of business, claiming that they are
especially qualified and financially responsible."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in In Re Linnards Estate 70 sug-
gests in its opinion that a stricter rule of law might be applied to
corporate fiduciaries than to individual trustees.
"We have not overlooked appellant's argument," says the court, "so ear-
nestly pressed, that owing to the special facilities possessed by such cor-
porations a stricter rule of responsibility should be exacted from trust
companies as fiduciaries than from the ordinary individual trustee."
Standards of care should be commensurate with skill proclaimed.
A banker should not, any more than a lawyer or a doctor, gain busi-
ness as a specialist and defend mistakes as a layman. Trust com-
panies should not stand before the public as paragons of financial
skill and before the bench as ordinary prudent citizens of Main
Street.
The modern corporate fiduciary, holding billions of trust assets
and serving as a trusted agent to pass the wealth of the nation from
one generation to the next, is as much affected with a public interest,
it would seem, as are telegraph companies, public utilities, and com-
mon carriers and should not, any more than these institutions, be
permitted to limit its liabilities by contract. Important limitations
on the power of common carriers to relieve themselves from liability
for losses to persons or property through a want of ordinary care
on their part or that of their servants are everywhere recognized.7'
The same principle applies to telegraph companies exempting them-
selves from liability for losses from their own negligent acts;72 to
contracts by masters exempting themselves from liability for negli-
gence to their servants; 73 and in a majority of jurisdictions to a
bailee for hire in contracts against his own negligence.74 While
68. Supra note 10, at 502, 114 N. E. 794 (Italics supplied).
69. In re Clark's Will, supra note 64.
70. 148 Atl. 912 (Pa. 1930).
71. COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 66, § 494.
72. Grinnell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 Mass. 299 (1873). For collected
cases from practically all jurisdictions see COOLEY, op. cit. sepra note 66, at
458 n. 97.
73. Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. 64, 18 S. W. 1149 (1892).
74. Inland Compress Co. v. Simmons, 59 Okla. 287, 159 Pac. 262 (1916).
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"the reasons which forbid such contracts," says Cooley,75 "have special
force in the business of carrying persons and goods, and of sending mes-
sages, they apply universally, and should be held to defeat all contracts
by which a party undertakes to put another at the mercy of his own faulty
conduct."
That institutions and individuals may in their relation to other in-
dividuals and to the public occupy a position, the duties and lia-
bilities of which are impervious to limitations by contract, is not
a new principle in law. The liberty of contract is not unrestricted.1 0
To give full force to the usual exoneration clause is to assert the
contrary, although the facts warrant a rigid application of the prin-
ciple that in certain instances there are inherent duties and liabilities
beyond the reach of contract.
The trustee appointed by a testamentary instrument or by con-
tract is clothed with certain inherent duties, one of the most funda-
mental of which is to preserve the trust estate with that degree of
diligence and care which an "ordinary prudent man would give to
his own like affairs." Strip from the trustee these inherent duties,
let him by contract erase his losses and commit all the acts that
ignorance, carelessness, or neglect will lead to, and the true trustee-
cestui que trust relationship is gone. The beneficiary finds him-
self dealing not with a trustee but with a protected adversary whom
he had no hand in selecting.
75. COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 66, § 496.
76. See Pound, Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 454.
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